

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

WASHINGTON

COPY NO. 1

JAN 13 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Walter B. Smith
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Psychological Strategy Program for the Middle East

1. Pursuant to the Board's decision of December 18, 1952, regarding completion of pending planning projects, I enclose a copy of the draft of Psychological Strategy Program for the Middle East for consideration by the Psychological Strategy Board on January 15, 1953.

2. In order to meet the Board's deadline, it has proved necessary to curtail the usual period for co-ordination of agency and PSB staff comments on the panel draft. Some changes are therefore to be expected in the present text, and if any agreed revisions are received before January 15, 1953, they will be transmitted to the Board as corrigenda to the basic paper. I hope, therefore, that by the time of the Board meeting, the paper will be in such shape as to permit at least approval in principle.

3. Considering the pressure on the panel in the last stage of its work, I feel that the draft has exceptionally high quality, and promises to become one of PSB's most significant achievements to date in energizing and co-ordinating the national psychological effort.

4. In accordance with the request of the panel chairman, I invite your attention to paragraphs 2 and 4 of his letter of transmittal dated January 12, 1953, a copy of which accompanies the basic document.

5. It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure, and that access to it be restricted on a need-to-know basis.

Alan G. Kirk

Alan G. Kirk
Director

Enclosure:

PSB D-22, Psychological Strategy
Program for the Middle East dated
January 8, 1953, Copy No. 43.

NSC review(s) completed.

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COPY NO. 31

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington, D. C.

13 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
David K. E. Bruce
Under Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Psychological Strategy Program for the Middle East

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/S/ Alan G. Kirk
Alan G. Kirk
Director

Enclosure:

PSB D-22, Psychological Strategy
Program for the Middle East dated
January 8, 1953,

Identical memo sent to:
General W. B. Smith, CIA
Mr. W. C. Foster, Defense
Mr. W. A. Harriman, MSA
Brig. Gen. M. C. Young, USAF, JC

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COPY NO. 31

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D. C.

12 January 1953

MEMORANDUM

TO : The Director, Psychological Strategy Board

FROM : Richard H. Sanger, Chairman, Panel "H", Middle East

SUBJECT: Psychological Strategy Program for the Middle East

In accordance with the request of the Psychological Strategy Board transmitted to me in the memorandum of 23 December 1952 from the Executive Officer, PSB, Panel "H" has formulated a draft on which there is sufficient agreement on content to enable me to forward it to you for consideration by the Board on 15 January 1953.

While substantial informal agency concurrence on the plan has been secured on a continuing basis during the drafting, final agency clearance has not been received. Therefore it is expected that corrigenda will result from agency comment and clearance which will be coordinated and incorporated in the final polished and approved plan.

It is requested that you call to the attention of the Board the fact that with the exception of a reference to Iran in this connection, no recommendations are made in the plan concerning courses of action should the Communists succeed in over-running the major part of the area. This results from the Panel's understanding that covert planning on this is already going forward under proper authority, rather than from any belief by the Panel that such planning is unnecessary.

It is further requested that you call the attention of the Board to the strong feeling of the Panel that the basic U.S. psychological objectives as set forth in this Program for Iran, Egypt, and the Arab States and Israel cannot be achieved until substantial progress has been made toward settlement of (1) the British-Iranian dispute, (2) the British-Egyptian controversies over the Sudan and Suez, and (3) the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whereas from the psychological point of view it appears that U. S. policy in regard to the British-Iranian dispute and the British-Egyptian controversies is moving forward constructively, it is also the opinion of this Panel that our psychological objectives cannot be achieved in any real measure in the absence of a thorough review of our policy toward Israel and the Arab States.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY
PROGRAM FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

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OUTLINE OF PLAN

1. Psychological Objectives
2. Basic Tasks Including Illustrative Actions
3. General Guidance:
 - a. Scope and Magnitude
 - b. Timing and Phasing
 - c. Special Considerations
 - d. Administrative

Annex A

Analysis of Choice of Psychological Objectives:

NSC Governing the Area

Assumptions

Strategic Situation

U.S. Capabilities

Feasibility Factors

Communist Opposition

Conclusions - Objectives

Conclusions - Tasks

Annex B



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1. Psychological Objectives

Within the frame of reference of approved U. S. National Objectives, the following should be the basic U. S. psychological objectives for the Middle East area.

(a) To strengthen confidence in the integrity of the U. S., in the principles for which it stands, and in the sincere friendship which the U. S. has for the peoples of this area.

(b) To convince the leaders and opinion-forming groups of the Middle East of the identity of their interests with the free world.

(c) To promote a realistic awareness of the threat to the aspirations and self-interests of the peoples of the Middle East that is posed by Communism, Soviet imperialism and Soviet-inspired revolution.

(d) To convince the leaders and opinion-forming groups of the Middle East countries that the only chance for adequate defense of their countries is through cooperation with the West; and that the determination of the United States, Great Britain, France and Turkey to make such defense successful, will not result in the imposition of a new form of imperialism.

(e) To encourage thinking of progressive elements so that they will advance constructive programs for the improvement of economic and social conditions which will produce a political stability better able to combat the twin extremes of Communism and anti-Western politico-religious fanaticism.

(f) To develop an attitude in the leaders and opinion-forming groups of the area that it is to their advantage to take steps which will facilitate the resolution of those international and intra-regional controversies which now weaken the security and stability of the area.

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2. Basic Tasks

The following tasks are suggested as possible courses of action through which the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency might be able to implement programs in support of the psychological objectives of this Plan. Under some of the tasks are listed, for illustrative purposes, possible specific courses of action. These illustrations are not all inclusive, but are designed to suggest guidance to the various agencies in the formulation of their support plans.

(a) To strengthen confidence in the integrity of the U. S., in the principles for which it stands, and in the sincere friendship which the U. S. has for the peoples of this area.

(1) To convince the Middle Eastern leaders and opinion-forming groups that the U. S.: opposes aggression as a basic policy; supports the Tripartite Declaration and will take effective action in support of the Declaration to prevent aggression; has the determination to assist the states of the area in defense of their territorial integrity against aggression from outside, and are willing to share positive responsibility together with the states of the area to this end.

(2) To demonstrate that the U. S. pursues independent policies governed by U. S. basic principles.

(3) To insure that Middle East peoples believe that the U. S. has respect for their sovereignty.

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(4) To enhance the value of U. S. informational activities by insuring that all U. S. psychological operations are conducted in a manner which gives appropriate and careful consideration to the basic cultural, social, and psychological factors of the people of the area:

(a) to insure that the "American Way of Life" theme is appropriately tailored to the needs and capacities of the area;

(b) to insure that propaganda emphasis is focussed on concrete actions rather than on abstract principles of Western political democracy;

(c) to publicize Point Four programs on a localized basis revolving around the theme of personal advantage to a given group or community;

(d) to set up machinery for promoting cooperation of business representatives including motion picture distributors so that they will not present ideas or engage in actions abroad which are injurious to U. S. prestige.

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(b) To convince the leaders and opinion-forming groups of the Middle East of the identity of their interests with the free world.

(1) Greatly to expand the principle of consultation with Middle Eastern leaders on regional, international, and United Nations issues.

(2) To emphasize the mutual community of principles which exist between the Middle East and the West, including respect for religion, respect for the individual, freedom from state control, respect for private property, and the sanctity of the home and family.

(3) To demonstrate the "godlessness" of the USSR as opposed to the mutual religious principles of the Middle East and the West.

(4) To increase exchange programs including:

(a) encouraging visits of religious, particularly Muslims, leaders to the U. S. and of American churchmen to the Middle East;

(b) supporting the colloquium plan for September 1953;

(c) increasing the number of lecture visits to the Middle East countries of persons of Middle Eastern origin and U. S. personalities exploitable for counter-propaganda purposes; and increasing the number of visits of Middle Eastern cultural leaders to the U. S.;

(d) initiating a program of stimulating visits to the U. S. by selected anti-Western elements, particularly journalists and important political figures, with a view to modifying or influencing their current attitudes;

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(e) increasing materially the number of fellowships available under Point Four or other auspices;

(f) developing a more effective orientation of students while in the U. S. with particular emphasis on the basic American principles, character, and spiritual values.

(5) To reflect the U. S. increased interest in and understanding of Middle East cultures.

(6) To influence Arab and Eastern press media personnel along lines favorable to U. S. objectives.

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(c) To promote a realistic awareness of the threat to the aspirations and self-interests of the peoples of the Middle East that is posed by Communism, Soviet imperialism and Soviet-inspired revolution.

(1) To use every possible technique to identify communism as a cloak for Soviet national imperialism, and to identify local communist elements as tools of a foreign power.

(2) To demonstrate that communism is a threat to the cultural patterns and social traditions of the individual, family, and community:

(a) to indoctrinate and utilize Americans serving in the area in official or private capacities in the techniques of generating an awareness of the threat of Soviet imperialism and communist doctrine, and to provide, for example, a central and coordinated plan by which personal contacts are utilized towards this end;

(b) to demonstrate U. S. belief that Middle East institutions are capable of evolving a better and indigenous socio-economic pattern than communism, and that the U. S. is prepared to support such evolution.

(3) To further expose Soviet abuse of USSR Muslims, Jews, Asians, and other religious and ethnic minorities, tailoring exposure to fit local groups.

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(d) To convince the leaders and opinion-forming groups of the Middle East countries that the only chance for adequate defense of their countries is through cooperation with the West; and that the determination of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Turkey to make such defense successful, will not result in the imposition of a new form of imperialism.

(1) To convince the leaders that neutrality does not guarantee independence and that present defense mechanisms of the Middle East are totally inadequate to prevent aggression in the area.

(2) To show the leaders that pending a build-up of their own strength which will require both time and a fuller socio-economic development, their immediate protection depends on Western military strength.

(3) To show that this dependence on the West dictates the necessity of making potential Western military support effective by regional defense arrangements including bases and troop deployment. To this end:

(a) to develop a state of mind which will permit setting up a formal regional defense organization in association with the U. S. and its Allies;

(b) to develop an attitude or receptiveness for the stationing of U. S. and Allied troops in or near the area.

(4) Whenever the psychological impact on Middle East leaders requires such action, to initiate or expand military training and provide token military equipment, including jet

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aircraft, and technical services.

(5) To demonstrate U. S. military might by:

(a) giving to the peoples who respect power, displays of power in naval and air shows of available air and sea units near the area;

(b) exploiting visits of ranking U. S. military personnel with a view to demonstrating U. S. interest in the defense of the area;

(c) inviting Middle East ranking military personnel to observe NATO maneuvers in the Mediterranean area and selected United States war games, maneuvers, etc., in the United States or abroad;

(d) watching for targets of opportunity (e.g. Mecca airlift or locust control) in which impressive amounts of armed services equipment can be used on psychological or humanitarian missions;

(e) using Air Force and Navy build-ups when necessary to vitiate the psychological impact of border pressure in any country threatened by the USSR.

(6) To clarify the respective military roles and responsibilities of all non-communist military powers with respect to the defense of the Middle East.

(7) To persuade the leaders to develop adequate forces to maintain internal security; and to develop an understanding among the leaders and opinion-forming groups of the Middle East of the damage to their own interests which may result from all forms of extremism, whether ultra-nationalist, xenophobic, religious, or totalitarian.

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(e) To encourage thinking of progressive elements so that they will advance constructive programs for the improvement of economic and social conditions which will produce a political stability better able to combat the twin extremes of Communism and anti-Western politico-religious fanaticism.

(1) Develop an attitude which will promote confidence in the possibility of orderly progress in political, economic, and social spheres, and the ability to obtain it.

(2) To lend support to progressive leaders by making known our endorsement of programs of constructive evolution including sound agrarian reforms (but to recognize the dangers to reform programs in transition phases and to be prepared to support such programs at these critical stages).

(3) To persuade Middle East leaders of the value of regional cooperation through one or more of the following means:

(a) inviting leaders of the region to draft a regional economic plan for the area to which the U. S. and possibly other powers could render support and assistance;

(b) considering the possibility of lending active U. S. support to the revitalization of the economic committee of the Arab league and extending economic aid thereto;

(c) considering promoting and encouraging the exchange of information on social reform measures along the line initiated by the International Islamic Economic Conference;

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(d) re-examining the practicability of supporting activation of the Economic Commission for the Middle East (ECME);

(e) promoting such other intra-regional cooperation between states as appears feasible;

(f) encouraging regional cooperation through the advisory committee to United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, by encouraging formal Arab participation thereon;

(g) encouraging the development of financial relationships between states of the area which would permit the utilization of the wealth of the oil rich states of the Middle East for the support of economic development projects in the less rich areas.

(4) To select and support such regional development schemes as will serve to demonstrate that material progress can be achieved through active cooperation with the U. S.

(5) While maintaining support of rural aid programs, to 25X1 undertake formulation or intensification of key urban projects.

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(f) To develop an attitude in the leaders and opinion-forming groups of the area that it is to their advantage to take steps which will facilitate the resolution of those international and intra-regional controversies which now weaken the security and stability of the area.

(1) To reduce tensions and fears between Israel and the Arab States:

(a) examine at the highest level the feasibility of linking some form of international guarantee of Arab-Israeli armistice lines or de facto boundaries with Middle Eastern participation in a regional defense organization;

(b) create conviction that the U. S. takes a stand against expansionism on the part of either Israel or the Arab States;

(c) demonstrate in practice the theory of impartiality of U. S. national policy towards Israel and the Arab States, particularly with respect to economic assistance, and with respect to statements by U. S. officials;

(d) demonstrate to Israel and the Arab States that it is to their mutual interest to undertake commencement of economic relations as a start toward resuming relationships normal to neighboring states;

(e) show the Israelis the local political and propaganda value, as well as moral necessity, of repatriating a certain number of Arab refugees;

(f) urge Israel to compensate Arab refugees for their properties, and to examine disposition of money

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paid by Germany to Israel with view to determining how it
can best be used to further settlement of the refugee
problem; 25X1

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(h) strengthen the influence of the moderate elements
in world Jewry and in Israel who believe that Israel's
survival depends on cooperation and friendship with the
Arab States.

(2) To seek to instill in key leaders a pride of heritage
which would move them to oppose the petty dynastic rivalries
and other jealousies which contribute to the instability of
the Arab world.

(3) To seek to promote a better understanding between the
Middle East countries, especially Egypt and Iran on the one
hand and our NATO partners, especially Britain and France, on
the other:

(a) to convince the British and French that it is
in their own interests to make their policies and actions
more compatible with local aspirations in order to achieve
orderly progress in the Middle East and also its orienta-
tion towards and collaboration with the West.

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3. General Guidance

a. Scope and Magnitude

(1) The present scale of U. S. psychological operations in the Middle East should be expanded, mainly by increasing the use of indigenous instruments and local channels.

(2) In certain circumstances U. S. personnel in the Middle East are a source of local friction and misunderstanding, consequently, U. S. personnel should be held at a minimum, and those stationed there should be given increased indoctrination as to their individual responsibilities.

b. Timing and Phasing

(1) This plan is to be effective upon approval by the Board.

(2) Long term psychological operations should be directed towards influencing all peoples of the area, but it is recognized that most regimes of the area do not necessarily rest on the democratic will of the peoples, and that the loci of power rest in special concentrated groups. Short range emergency programs, therefore, governing and leadership groups, including the new urban and intellectual classes, are the primary targets. Additional effort should be made to identify and influence potential leadership.

(3) Examples of developments which would affect the timing and phasing of this Plan include settlement of the British-Egyptian differences over the Sudan, the British evacuation of the Suez, the establishment of the Middle East Defense Organization, or the partial or complete collapse of Iran.

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(4) Time phasing of certain operations which should be implemented at a high policy level should be brought to the attention of the Psychological Strategy Board by the operating agency concerned.

c. Special Considerations

(1) In the Middle East, to an unusual degree, political action constitutes its own psychological strategy. It must, therefore, be recognized that pure psychological manipulation will be of slight, if any, value unless identified with concrete political, economic, or military action.

(2) In no other area of the world do personal contacts and the confidences that result from personal relationships play a more basic or significant role in international understanding. Such relationships should, therefore, be encouraged among the U. S. personnel in the area.

(3) In exploiting psychological opportunities in the Middle East, special attention should be paid to the fact that underlying attitudes of basic respect for the principles of the U. S. exists in the area, and a latent faith that the U. S. will live up to the principles for which it stands.

(4) On the other hand it should be recognized that this respect and faith is submerged by suspicion arising out of confusion and resentment caused by apparent differences between U. S. policy statements and U. S. actions. Confusion and resentment exist most seriously in the matter of U. S. pro-Arab statements vs U. S. material support of Israel, and pro-national statements vs. belief that the U. S. is the source of power behind French and British policies in the area. Lacking new policy statements

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or implementation which would automatically explain these apparent contradictions, U. S. psychological strategy must minimize these differences by diverting attention from them or when opportunity affords by concentrating attention, for example, on those concrete accomplishments which do prove the sincerity of U. S. declarations. In other cases we may demonstrate that support of Middle East nations and support of legitimate and legal U. K. and French positions are not mutually exclusive.

(5) It is important that U. S. psychological strategy create the impression that the U. S., in seeking international cooperation, leads from strength and determination rather than from fear or uncertainty. The level of military strength which the U. S. is prepared or may be prepared to maintain in or near the area will have significant repercussions on the crystallization of such attitudes in the Middle East. This factor should be examined against the requirements of this Plan to help achieve the psychological objectives.

(6) U. S. psychological strategy in the Middle East has a unique opportunity to present the U. S. as the true champion of social and economic progress and should, therefore, seize every means of realizing this opportunity.

(7) Doctrinal warfare per se can be waged in the Middle East only among the small, though highly influential, group of intellectuals. Propaganda activities based on the doctrinal approach and aimed at the general public should be carefully handled to avoid a backfire from the emotional appeal which communism has for the [] masses. Rather, strong emphasis should be placed on the theme of Soviet imperialism and the anti-religious aspects of the Soviet regime.

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(8) Should the U. S. political and psychological operations show marked success strong Soviet reaction can be expected. Soviet psychological strategy and propaganda can be expected to increase emphasis on the themes of Zionism, peace, and British-French-U. S. imperialism. In their over-all program the communists will use all weapons at their disposal; they will probably use the weapons of assassination, violence and rioting to a greater extent than they have in Europe. The U. S. must be prepared to meet and counter this program.

(9) The real danger that Iran may succumb to communism must be recognized. Contingency preparations for psychological operations in such an eventuality must be made on a priority basis and within the terms of NSC 136/1, paragraphs 5 and 6.

d. Administrative

(1) Coordination, Review and Evaluation:

The Director, Psychological Strategy Board, shall be responsible for continuing coordination, review, and evaluation of this basic Plan. The Director, in his discretion, may establish in Washington, D. C., a coordinating panel of interested departments and agencies. The Director may also authorize establishment of a coordinating panel within the area made up of representatives of the various chiefs of mission to the countries concerned, to meet periodically in order to coordinate and evaluate psychological operations and submit progress reports and recommendations to the Psychological Strategy Board through the appropriate member agency.

(2) Supporting Plans:

Supporting plans prepared by the Department of State, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director

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for Mutual Security shall be coordinated by the Director, Psychological Strategy Board.

The strategy of manipulating the timing and phasing of the programs in support of national objectives will be the responsibility of the operating agencies. However, in case of necessary changes in basic assumptions with resultant conflicts between agencies, the question of coordination will be referred to the Psychological Strategy Board.

(3) Legislative:

Congressional support for legislation necessary to further the objectives of this Plan will be developed by the Departments and Agencies concerned in accordance with normal programming procedures. In addition, the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board, using the resources of the Psychological Strategy Board member Departments and Agencies and of other Departments and Agencies of the Government, will review current and proposed legislation which impinges on or importantly affects the strategic psychological objectives of the United States in the Middle East. Based on this review, he will recommend such Board action as seems appropriate and desirable in relation to the successful execution of this Plan. Specifically, he will review recommendations designed to modify existing legislation governing foreign aid in order to provide agencies concerned limited discretionary authority to meet emergencies and/or to overcome political or psychological obstacles to the acceptance of such aid.

(4) Domestic Public Information:

Where appropriate, U. S. domestic public information programs in support of the general objectives of this Plan will be developed by the member Departments and Agencies.

Annex A
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ANNEX A


NSC 129/1 lists as the ultimate U. S. National Objectives in the Middle East area the insurance that the area and its resources remain available to the U. S. and its Allies. NSC 129/1 recognizes, as threats to this insurance, instability within the countries of the area, the danger of increasing Soviet and decreasing Western influence, a lack of will and ability to resist aggression, and a feeling of inferiority which breeds tensions and hostilities within the area and in relationships with the West. Steps for the elimination of these threats are, therefore, also listed as objectives of U. S. policy.

In listing the psychological objectives with which to support the National Objectives it is assumed that there will be no Soviet military aggression and no local communist or rightist insurrections which would completely bar the West from the area as a whole before January 1955.

STRATEGIC SITUATION:

The most immediate threat to attainment of U. S. objectives in the Middle East comes from within the area itself in the form of dangerous political and economic instability.

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[REDACTED]

The Middle East in general, and Iran in particular, occupies a key strategic position in the East-West struggle. Because of its geographic location it is vulnerable to intervention or armed attack by the USSR and to political subversion. Historically the area and especially Iran has won or maintained its precarious independence through balance of power factors. New factors, however transitory, added to those weighing in the historic balance now threaten to shift this balance in favor of the Soviets. These factors are: (1) the continuing Arab-Israeli antagonism kept alive particularly by the refugee problem and bitter resentment of the U. S. role in the creation of Israel; (2) the decline of British and French influence without the attendant development of responsible local authority; (3) the British-Iranian dispute over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and to a lesser degree the British-Egyptian disagreements and the French position vis-a-vis Morocco and Tunisia; (4) questions raised as to U. S. power position by current events such as the apparent stalemate in Korea; (5) Soviet subversive activities in the area.

Underlying many of the factors causing instability is the impact of Western ideas regarding political independence, economic self-determination, and the rights of man, plus the impact, however belated, of the industrial revolution. These ideas and forces have created irrestible desire for change yet they have fallen in a territory where neither the social machinery or the leadership have been adequate or sufficiently experienced to utilize or direct them.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The area is ripe for revolutionary change of basic political, social, and economic patterns. There is no possibility that this change can be suppressed, but the change can take one of three forms: (1) it can be channelled into evolutionary forms; (2) it can take the form of controlled revolution favorable to the West; (3) it can take a revolutionary path leading to chaos, fragmentation, and eventual Soviet control.

The central problem for the U. S. is to channel these forces in paths which will further U. S. and Western aims. The ultimate end of U. S. policy is to insure that the area and its resources are available to strengthen the free world. To do so requires that the U. S. and its Allies persuade the leaders of the area to develop and maintain armed forces adequate to insure internal security. Such forces would be inadequate for resisting Soviet aggression. The U. S. must, therefore, also create an atmosphere which will allow entrance of Allied troops into the area should such a move become necessary to prevent a Soviet over-running all or part of the area. This atmosphere can best be obtained by creation of a Western-Middle East Defense Organization. But to attain such a situation of strength would require the cooperation of the Middle East governments, not only militarily, but in the basic endeavor to eradicate enough of the internal and external causes of unrest to allow desirable political and economic forces to come into play. The Middle East leaders themselves have been unable or unwilling to create internal security forces adequate to prevent subversion activities or to control or to direct the explosive forces of change into constructive and evolutionary channels. It is doubtful whether the

25X1 leaders even with the best of intentions - [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] - can now bring about the orderly changes desirable
to the West without outside technical and financial assistance. This
assistance they have also been unwilling or reluctant to seek or accept.
Faced with the complexity of their own problems the Middle East leaders
have on the one hand attempted to view the East-West conflict as something
in which they are not directly concerned (but from which they may improve
their position vis-a-vis the Western world), on the other perversely
lashed out at the West, the very elements which could guarantee their
survival. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Mis-
taking effect for cause the attacks are specifically leveled at the two
most obvious indications of the area's weakness -- the vestiges of
imperialism and the new State of Israel.

25X1 The first step in a strategic psychological plan for the area must
be to create a psychological atmosphere which will force the leaders of
the area to face squarely up to their problems and permit them to cooperate
with Western efforts to prevent the loss of the area to the USSR. In order
to do this the U. S. must act to remove the symbols used as whipping boys
by the area politicians -- remove them, distract attention from them, or
at the very least, disassociate U. S. actions from them. Most probably
at the present stage of deterioration of U. S.-Middle East relations mere
neutrality or disassociation from the situations which are objectionable
to the Middle East will not be of a psychological advantage to the U. S.,
for Middle East emotions and frustrations are such that they will demand
concrete demonstrations of U. S. sentiment favorable to the nationalism
of the area.

U. S. CAPABILITIES

U. S. prestige in the Middle East is presently low and may even decline further. However, plans for the attainment of U. S. objectives in the area are largely based on the assumption that there exists a basic, deep-seated respect for the U. S., temporarily eclipsed, but which, if properly evoked, will reassert itself and create an atmosphere of receptivity for cooperation in reform and defense programs.

The U. S. presently has in varying degrees the capability of influencing the governments of the area to act in a manner which will be consistent with U. S. objectives. It can counsel, guide, and support progressive political action. This is presently most notably true in Egypt where technical support of a reform government definitely takes on a political hue. The U. S. is, for once, in a position to identify itself with powerful forces of change and progress -- an identification which in other parts of the world the Communists have invariably managed to assume. The communist forces in this area are not now organized to capture this psychological prize and the U. S. must take every opportunity to capitalize on the situation.

In passing it should be noted that the U. S. can no longer play the role of the detached middle man or honest broker in political or international disputes in the area, and that political action involves continuing political responsibilities.

The U. S. has the capacity through technical and economic aid of vastly increasing the social and economic well-being of the area.

The U. S. has the capabilities to train and equip adequate internal security forces within the area.

The U. S. has the capability to increase respect for its armed strength by demonstrations of power by extant air and sea units, and by commitment of troops in or near the area.

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The U. S. has long established instruments for attaining psychological, and through them, National Objectives: (1) it has normal official diplomatic, military, and aid missions, the impacts of which can be more immediately concrete and visible than in, say, the more complicated and sophisticated political and economic structures of Western Europe; (2) it has philanthropic groups with long records of humanitarian service which can illustrate U. S. good-will; (3) it has important business groups, sources of revenue and guidance for the countries; (4) it has in the area ethnic and religious groups with blood ties in the U. S.; (5) it has a long history of a non-imperialistic respect for national sovereign equality, racial and religious tolerance which though temporarily eclipsed in the Arab mind can re-emerge as a powerful psychological weapon.

If the U. K. and French positions on the Middle East are to be considered as part of U. S. capabilities they must be recognized at the moment as serious psychological burdens. There is, however, a residue of French and British social, cultural, political, and economic influence in the area which if properly utilized may yet count in favor of the West. Further, the U. K. has the only easily available Western military forces for the initial protection of the Middle East in case of sudden attack. These forces, coupled with certain treaty positions, also represent stability factors in the area. The U. S. must carefully weigh its position vis-a-vis the French and the British in the Middle East on an ad hoc basis so as to obtain maximum psychological benefit from a position of independence or allied solidarity as the case requires.

FEASIBILITY FACTORS

The situations in the Middle East which threaten to deny or limit realization of U. S. psychological or National Objectives include: Arab

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fear of Israeli expansionism, the refugee problem produced by the creation of Israel, the Anglo-Iranian oil issue, the supposed U. S. support of colonialism which has led to an adamant French attitude on North Africa, and, to a lesser degree, the Anglo-Egyptian differences on the Sudan and the Suez. These concrete situations have created among the Arabs and the Iranians a resentment and an almost psychopathic suspicion of Anglo-French-U. S. "imperialistic" designs in the area. The U. S. cannot now divorce itself from these problems and even an impartial attitude may not prevent a continuing decline of U. S. prestige in the Middle East world. The U. S. must take an active part in solving these problems to Middle East satisfaction if U. S. objectives are to be generally realized. Within the present conditions of Arab hostility towards the U. S., routine diplomatic efforts and [] propaganda may realize a limited number of psychological objectives. However, unless the U. S. can forward a settlement of the Iranian oil and the Sudan-Suez situations; unless the U. S. can create the conviction among Middle East leaders that it respects and will assist in the defense of the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of the states of the area -- especially vis-a-vis possible Israeli incursions; and unless the U. S. supports peoples who have demonstrated their capacity for sovereign independence and to maintain same by orderly and legal means, Middle East cooperation with the West in positive efforts to strengthen the defense of the area will not be forthcoming. If such becomes the case, the danger to U. S. objectives in the area will be real and immediate.

COMMUNIST OPPOSITION

There is danger of success in any demagogic movement in the Middle East. Therefore, while in the area communist parties -- with the exception


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of the Tudeh party in Iran -- are generally weak, they represent a constant
potential danger. 25X1



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[redacted] Communists have, however, been able to exploit certain situations; the aspirations of the Greek Orthodox, Gregorian Armenian, Kurdish minorities and the Iranian Azerbaijani; the Middle East desire for neutrality and consequent susceptibility to Soviet world wide "peace" campaigns; increasing Middle East resentment of domestic corruption and economic exploitations; unemployment; differences between rich and poor; U. S. support of Israel as contrasted with Soviet opposition to Israel as a Western "imperialistic" military base."

Communism appeals most strongly and effectively in those areas where Westernization and education is greatest, where nationalism is strongest, where urbanization is most advanced, and where minorities are largest. In many areas the religious or ethnic minorities supply the brains of the communist leadership, and in some areas the majority of the following too. Communist front organizations, notably the Partisans of Peace, have been more successful than the Party per se although appealing approximately to the same groups. These front organizations are instruments of Soviet propaganda



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West. The present phase of communist activities is aimed at evicting

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representatives of the West from the area; take-over plans are probably several phases in the future.

CONCLUSIONS - OBJECTIVES

Weighing all factors involved -- the strategic situation within the area, the U. S. capabilities, and factors presently militating against attainment of U. S. objectives, it is concluded that the U. S. has the possibility of realizing its psychological objectives. Long-range programs for the establishment of dynamic stability and economic improvement must be a basic approach but at the same time it is recognized that [] 25X1

[] the Middle East could overnight produce unpredicted situations calling for a new U. S. approach. Such sudden developments would not necessarily militate against U. S. objectives -- for example -- the unpredicted but salutary events of the past months in Egypt. Perhaps as in no other part of the world are political targets of opportunity more likely to arise, and U. S. policy must be such as to allow for rapid readjustment.

For the U. S. to capitalize on a swiftly changing political pattern in the Middle East or to participate in the less dramatic but important fight against social and economic evils and corruption which beset the area, confidence among the leaders concerning the friendly nature of U. S. intentions must be revived. The non-imperialistic record of the U. S. belies 25X1

present Middle East suspicions on that score; [] 25X1

[]

The U. S. must, therefore, specifically make every effort to put into proper perspective the true significance of U. S. cooperation with the British and the French; and it must allay fears of Israel, the creation of which state also has, to the Arabs, imperialistic connotations, and the

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expansion of which looms as a real threat to the Arab world.

The Arab states are immature and lacking in political imagination. They tend to recognize only immediate and experienced political situations and, therefore, direct their ire at the Western Powers under whose domination they were until very recently. The mere fact that the Arab states have never been under Soviet domination automatically makes the Soviet threat to their independence seem unreal and remote. The U. S. must demonstrate to the Arab world that whatever their present differences with the free world a basic mutuality of interests exist and that it is the USSR which presents the real imperialistic threat to their continued sovereignty. Iran is more aware of the Soviet threat, but the nature of its leadership may negate this awareness.

Certain road blocks on the path to Middle East-U. S. cooperation are then clear and recognizable. When these external "causes" of Middle East hostility are alleviated or relegated to the background, Arab leadership confidence in U. S. intentions may be renewed. When leaders can be convinced that their own safety and interests -- if nothing else -- depend on adequate defenses for the area and on the urgent correction of the economic and social ills, active cooperation with the West will follow, and from cooperation will come economic advancement and greater stability. The people, with the promise of better living levels, will in turn have a stake in their own destiny and a consequent willingness to cooperate in the preservation of their freedom.

CONCLUSIONS - TASKS

Given the weaknesses and strengths above, U. S. psychological tasks must be such as to insure that: the governments of the area keep the organizational capacities of the outlawed communist parties low; the

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pro-Western elements win over and keep the new educated urbanized groups; appropriate minority groups are persuaded of the truth of real Soviet attitude towards aspirations of minorities; the extreme right is prevented from collaborating with the communists or from effecting its programs; and all classes are persuaded in specific and concrete terms rather than by generalities that the USSR is the real imperialist threat to the Middle East, and that only with the U. S. can the Middle East attain realization of peace, freedom, and advancement.

The initial U. S. psychological effort in the Middle East is designed to soothe wounded Middle East ego, and conciliate Middle East opinion. It would, however, demonstrate a lack of understanding of the Middle East mind if, in order to effect conciliation, U. S. political concessions and material assistance were given freely without conditions. The Middle East mind would not understand it and would not respect it. The U. S. must demonstrate sympathy for the Middle East aspirations but at the same time the U. S. must impress on the Middle East leaders its unequivocal determination, by any means at its command, including military action, that the area will remain free of Soviet control.

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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE DIRECTOR OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON

MAR 11 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Implementation of PSB D-22, A Psychological
Strategy Program for The Middle East

1. Section 3 d (1) of PSB D-22 provides that "The Director, Psychological Strategy Board, shall be responsible for continuing coordination, review, and evaluation of this basic Plan. The Director, in his discretion, may establish in Washington, D. C., a coordinating panel of interested departments and agencies. The Director may also authorize establishment of a coordinating panel within the area made up of representatives of the various chiefs of mission to the countries concerned, to meet periodically in order to coordinate and evaluate psychological operations and submit progress reports and recommendations to the Psychological Strategy Board through the appropriate member agency."

2. Section 3 d (2) further provides that "Supporting plans prepared by the Department of State, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director for Mutual Security shall be coordinated by the Director, Psychological Strategy Board."

3. In discharging these responsibilities may I suggest, on the basis of our past experience with regard to follow-up work on other PSB approved plans, that the Central Intelligence Agency designate a substantive officer at a responsible level to work with the designees of the Department of State and the Department of Defense and with an officer of the PSB staff, in coordinating the implementation of this plan.

4. Under this procedure, the officer designated by the Central Intelligence Agency would have the responsibility of:

(a) Being fully informed concerning the preparation of the Central Intelligence Agency's supporting plans, and acting as the principal point of contact between the Central Intelligence Agency and the representatives of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, as well as of PSB Staff, in the coordination of the supporting plans called for by the Middle East Plan.

- 2 -

(b) Meeting occasionally - only when circumstances require - with representatives designated by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and by me.

5. These consultations would be for the purpose of:


(a) Resolving contradictions or conflicts which may develop among supporting plans, and closing gaps which may be found to exist;

(b) Agreeing upon priorities among and phasing of these operational or supporting plans;

(c) Agreeing upon the timing and type of periodic reports to the Director of PSB on progress in implementing PSB D-22;

(d) Considering the advisability of establishing in the area a field coordinating panel, and if such a panel is established, reviewing reports on its activities with a view to assisting in further coordination between Washington and the field.

6. If you are in agreement with the above suggestions, I would appreciate it if you would designate at your earliest convenience, an appropriate Central Intelligence Agency representative.


George A. Morgan
Acting Director

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MAR 21 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. GEORGE A. MOHRAN
Acting Director
Psychological Strategy Board

SUBJECT : Implementation of PSB D-22, A Psychological Strategy
Program for the Middle East

1. Receipt of your memorandum of 11 March 1953 on this subject
is acknowledged.

25X1 2. [] has been designated Central Intelligence
Agency representative to work with a Psychological Strategy Board
officer in coordinating the implementation of D-22. [] 25X1

25X1 []

Allen J. Dulles
Director

[] 25X1

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